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The continuing conflict between Russia and Ukraine, together with the increased tension in 
relations between Russia and the West, have led the Belarusian authorities to attempt to re-
define their country’s foreign policy by stressing neutrality towards the two sides in the con-
flict. As a result, over the last year or so Belarus has clearly adopted a non-committal stance. 
Minsk is trying to play the part of a neutral mediator in the hope that this will safeguard 
it in the event of escalation of tensions between Russia and the West, which is seen as the 
greatest threat to the country’s security at the present time. Thus Minsk is returning to the 
notion, discussed in the early 1990s, of Belarus striving for neutrality. Officially, the goal of 
neutrality is still stated in the Belarusian Constitution. However there are serious limitations 
to the effectiveness of this new strategy, due to Minsk’s close military alliance with Moscow, 
and therefore Belarus will not be entirely credible on the international stage as a country that 
wishes to remain neutral.
Concepts from the 1990s not put 
into practice
The Belarusian people’s deep-rooted recollec-
tion of experiences in World War II1 and the 
terrible consequences of the Chernobyl dis-
aster (Belarus suffered the most of all of the 
former USSR countries) resulted in the issue of 
neutrality being an important factor in the dis-
cussion about foreign policy that ensued once 
independence was gained. The universal aware-
ness among the Belarusian elite that Belarus is 
situated between East and West, which would 
1	 According	 to	 official	 Belarusian	 estimates,	 during	mili-
tary operations and repression by the German occupier, 
between 2.5 and 3 million residents of today’s Belarus, 
which was almost a third of the population of the Be-
larus Socialist Soviet Republic at that time, perished. 
Most of the industrial and municipal infrastructure was 
destroyed (90% was destroyed in Minsk, Gomel and 
Vitebsk). See Последствия Великой Отечественной 
войны для Беларуси, https://archives.gov.by/index.
php?id=697135 
have	naturally	defined	a	balanced	 internation-
al strategy, became a major factor reinforcing 
the line of non-involvement on either side. This 
idea was presented as being closely linked to 
the declaration that it was foregoing the sta-
tus of a nuclear power (the nuclear warheads 
inherited from the Soviet Army were eventu-
ally moved out of Belarus by November 1996). 
At the same time, in order to underline its decla-
ration of neutrality in a regional context, in the 
first	half	of	the	1990s,	Minsk	tried	via	diplomat-
ic channels to promote the creation of a nucle-
ar-free zone thoughout the entire CEE region. 
This was not received well by other countries2. 
Regardless of the moderately sceptical response 
abroad, the idea of neutrality became so funda-
mental for the Belarusian authorities that it was 
mentioned	in	all	official	documents	at	the	time	
2	 У.Е.	 Снапкоускі,	 Гісторыя знешняй палітыкі Беларусі, 
Mińsk	2004,	pp.	248–9.	
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specifying the priorities of Belarusian foreign 
policy and the grounds for the country’s admin-
istrative	structure.	Art.	18	of	the	current	Bela-
rusian Constitution also states that the country 
strives to be neutral3. 
Even in the early 1990s, a tendency emerged 
to reconstruct a new form of close relations in 
an alliance with the former decision-maker 
in	 the	 USSR,	 Russia.	 Belarus	 ratified	 the	 1992	
Tashkent collective security treaty, thereby en-
tering the military alliance being built by Mos-
cow based on some former USSR countries, and 
which was subsequently transformed into the 
Collective Security Treaty Organisation (CSTO). 
A	major	factor	helping	to	boost	Russia’s	 influ-
ence was the complete dependence of Belarus’s 
economy on preferential conditions for supplies 
of Russian oil and gas, crucially important ac-
cess to the sales market in Russia, and the ties 
of cooperation forged during the Soviet era. 
When Aleksandr Lukashenko came to power in 
1994,	 this	significantly	sped	up	the	expansion	
of	Russian	influence	to	include	Belarus.	The	Be-
larusian President, appealing to Soviet nostal-
gia and an idea of Slavic unity popular in Bela-
rusian society at that time, initiated and actively 
supported the process of Russian-Belarusian 
integration. This led in 1999 to the creation of 
the Union State of Russia and Belarus. Within 
this structure a Regional Military Group was 
also formed, which was responsible for organ-
ising joint military exercises, among other acts4. 
3 W. Baluk, Polityka zagraniczna i bezpieczeństwa, 
in Białoruś Europa Wschodnia – dekada transformacji. 
Białoruś,	 B.J.	 Albin,	 W.	 Baluk	 (ed.),	 Wrocław	 2004, 
p. 272. See also the Belarusian Constitution, http://pra-
vo.by/pravovaya-informatsiya/normativnye-dokumenty/
konstitutsiya-respubliki-belarus/ 
4	 Л.	 Спаткай, Военное сотрудничество Беларуси 
с Россией, 10 March 2015, https://bsblog.info/voennoe-
sotrudnichestvo-belarusi-s-rossiej/ 
This	 led	 to	 significantly	 closer	military	 cooper-
ation between the two countries, which also 
went beyond the Collective Security Treaty Or-
ganisation. Belarusian foreign policy therefore 
began to focus principally on a strategic partner-
ship with Russia5, while the idea of striving for 
neutrality as written into the Constitution merely 
became little more than a catchy slogan in the 
propaganda used by the Belarusian authorities. 
Shrinking room for manoeuvre between 
Russia and the West
Unlike his predecessor Boris Yeltsin, Russian 
President Vladimir Putin expected Belarus to sell 
its	strategic	industrial	firms	and	gradually	give	
up its sovereignty in favour of integration into 
the Union State in exchange for its continued 
economic and energy privileges. In practice, 
this would have meant complete subjugation 
to Moscow6. Even though Lukashenko never 
formally withdrew from the scheme for inte-
gration with Russia, out of fear of losing sover-
eignty he successfully blocked the development 
of that process, while at the same time trying 
to retain the highest possible level of Russian 
subsidies, which were vital in order to shore up 
Belarus’s outdated centrally controlled econo-
my. Under these circumstances, the only way 
to remain autonomous was to attempt to strike 
a balance between pressure from Moscow and 
dialogue with the West, above all with the EU. 
The extent of Belarus’s dependence on Russia is 
such that the Belarusian authorities have never 
been able to attain a perfect balance between 
5 Vladimir Ulakhovich has pointed out the evolution of 
Minsk’s	 strategy	 from	 a	 policy	 of	 neutrality	 (1991–4),	
a	multi-vector	 policy	 (1994–7)	 and	 the	 strategic	 part-
nership	 with	 Russia	 (from	 1997).	 See	 В.	 Улахович,	
Внешняя Политика Республики Беларусь 1991–2001: 
опыт концептуального самоопределения, in Внешняя 
Политика Беларуси в исторической перспективе, 
Mińsk	2002,	p.	233.	
6 The President of Russia made his position explicitly clear 
in 2002 when he openly proposed that Belarus join the 
Russian Federation. Путин фактически предложил 
Белоруссии войти в состав России, 15 August 2002, 
https://www.svoboda.org/a/24190894.html
It is stated in art. 18 of the current Consti-
tution that Belarus aims to be neutral.
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foreign and economic policy towards Russia 
and the EU. Nevertheless, this strategy was 
an effort to exploit the advantage of being stra-
tegically placed between Russia and the West, 
which was linked to the concept of neutrality. 
Although it often led to crises with Moscow, 
which was irritated by the lack of progress in 
integration, and to the breaking off at certain 
intervals of talks with the EU, which was dis-
mayed at breaches of human rights, this strat-
egy did produce autonomy, especially with re-
spect to the expansion-minded Russia. 
Minsk’s	field	of	manoeuvre	with	respect	to	for-
eign policy narrowed considerably as a result 
of	the	Russian-Ukraine	conflict	in	2014.	The	an-
nexation of Crimea to Russia and the proclama-
tion of the separatist republics in the Donbas 
caused Lukashenko great concern about the 
dangerous precedent of Russia’s interference 
in the territorial integrity of a former Soviet 
republic in the immediate vicinity of Belarus. 
For this reason, Minsk did not recognise those 
territorial changes, and neither did it support 
the separatists in eastern Ukraine7. On the oth-
er hand, the Belarusian president tried to avoid 
openly criticising Russia’s conduct8. Belarusian 
foreign policy diplomacy showed a keen inter-
est in holding peace talks in Minsk in Septem-
7	 In	2008	Belarus	was	also	reticent	with	respect	to	the	in-
vasion of Georgia by Russian troops, and did not recog-
nise the Russian-supported Abkhazia and South Ossetia. 
8 A typical example of this ambiguous position was 
a	statement	made	on	23	March	2014,	when	Lukashenko	
said on one hand that “Ukraine should be an integral 
and indivisible country” and on the other recognised 
Crimea as a de facto part of Russia; see Лукашенко 
«такими» матерными словами не разговаривает, 
23	 March	 2014,	 http://naviny.by/rubrics/poli-
tic/2014/03/23/ic_articles_112_184995/
ber	2014	and	February	2015	to	resolve	the	con-
flict	in	Donbas,	to	build	up	the	country’s	image	
as a neutral mediator. 
This balanced approach on the part of Minsk 
to	 the	 two	 sides	 of	 the	 conflict	 was	 not	 re-
ceived well by Russia, which expected its ally 
to be unreservedly loyal and fully support its 
actions in Ukraine. This led to harsh criticism 
in the Russian media and from Russian experts 
to an extent never seen before in response to 
demonstrations of autonomy by the Belarusian 
authorities, both on the international stage 
and in the sphere of historical, linguistic, and 
cultural policy. At the same time, there was 
a distinct escalation in Belarus in activities by 
Russian or pro-Russian social and paramilitary 
organisations, promoting the idea of the ‘Rus-
sian world’9. Belarus’s situation was complicat-
ed further by growing tension between the EU, 
US, and Russia. Moscow increased the pressure 
on Belarus10. Minsk’s foreign policy, which was 
centred on survival and de-escalating tensions, 
was not suited to the Kremlin’s aggressive strat-
egy in the former Soviet region and towards 
the West. 
However Minsk proved unable to make full use 
of the potential for dialogue with the West 
which was resumed at the turn of 201611. On 
one hand, the inability of an authoritarian re-
gime to become truly democratic was a limita-
tion, as it had been in past years, but fear of 
9	 For	more	on	this	subject	see	K.	Kłysiński	and	P.	Żochowski,	
The End Of The Myth of a brot herly Belarus? Russian 
soft power in Belarus after 2014: the background and 
its manifestations, OSW Studies, https://www.osw.waw.
pl/en/publikacje/osw-studies/2016-11-07/end-myth-a-
brot-herly-belarus-russian-soft-power-belarus-after 
10 The pressure from Russia manifested itself in an at-
tempt in autumn 2015 to force the Belarusian authori-
ties to consent to the placement of a Russian airbase in 
Babruysk. Placing Russian troops in Belarus permanently 
would have been an unprecedented move, and would 
have	significantly	reduced	Minsk’s	autonomy	on	the	in-
ternational stage.
11 In the aftermath of the events in Ukraine, Lukashenko 
decided to release all Belarusian political prisoners in 
August 2015, opening the way for talks with the EU, 
which eventually lifted most of the sanctions against 
Belarus on 15 February 2016. The dialogue resumed 
at that time continues today. 
Belarus’ foreign policy, centred on sur-
vival, has been ill-suited to the Kremlin’s 
aggressive strategy in the former Soviet 
region.
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the Kremlin’s reaction was an equally impor-
tant factor. Minsk had considerably less room 
for	manoeuvre,	and	the	tactic	of	finding	a	bal-
ance which it had employed up until that time 
ceased to be effective. This led the Belarusian 
authorities to return to the idea of neutrality 
that had been abandoned years before.  
An attempt to get ahead, 
i.e. the Helsinki-2 concept
At the 26th annual session of the OSCE Par-
liamentary Assembly in Minsk, Lukashenko 
made	 an	 official	 appeal	 to	 the	 international	
community to start broad peace talks based 
on OSCE structures. The aim of the initiative 
was to de-escalate tensions in Eastern Europe 
(and on a broader level in other parts of the 
world as well) followed by the drafting of 
new comprehensive agreements guaranteeing 
peaceful cooperation, above all between the 
main international actors, i.e. Russia, the EU, 
the US, and China. The format Minsk proposed 
for these talks was derived from the 1975 Se-
curity and Cooperation in Europe Conference 
held in Helsinki, and was thus given the name 
Helsinki-212. At the same time the Belarusian 
president, based on Belarus’ experience in or-
ganising talks on Ukraine13, named Minsk as the 
best place to host the peace process. Lukashen-
ko’s declaration prompted measures aimed at 
arranging peace talks in the Helsinki-2 format. 
In	January	2018	the	Belarusian	foreign	minister	
Vladimir Makiey stated that the foreign minis- 
 
12	 For	 more	 on	 this	 subject	 see	 А.	 Класковский,	
Лукашенко разогревает отношения с Европой 
холодным летом 2017-го, https://naviny.by/arti-
cle/20170705/1499264869-lukashenko-razogrevaet-ot-
nosheniya-s-evropoy-holodnym-letom-2017-go
13 Belarusian government representatives have consistent-
ly presented Belarus as a ‘security donor’ in the region at 
all available international forums over the last four years, 
based precisely on a conciliatory approach to the con-
flict	in	Ukraine.	See	Беларусь убедительно обозначает 
себя как донора безопасности в Европе – Мясникович, 
28	 November	 2017,	 http://www.belta.by/politics/view/
belarus-ubeditelno-oboznachaet-sebja-kak-dono-
ra-bezopasnosti-v-evrope-mjasnikovich-277888-2017/
try had produced detailed plans, submitted for 
consultation to the governments in other coun-
tries that might be interested in taking part in 
the talks14. 
The international conference on regional se-
curity, attended by several hundred experts 
from Europe, Central Asia, China, the US, and 
Canada15 and held in Minsk in May this year, 
was a major event promoting Belarus as an in-
ternational mediator. Lukashenko also attend-
ed the talks, and said in his speech that a new 
European security system was needed; he also 
reaffirmed	Belarus’	willingness	 to	 take	part	 in	
the process16. The Belarusian government rep-
resentatives participating in the conference 
avoided criticising NATO, which was probably 
intended to reinforce Minsk’s image of neutral-
ity. At the same time, during a visit to Belgium 
on 31 May, Makiey gave an assurance that Be-
larus was working to bring about greater sta-
bility in the region, and that therefore it was 
not planning to locate any military bases on its 
territory, but reserved the right to change its 
14 The details of this concept have not been released. 
At the same time minister Makiey acknowledged that 
until now foreign partners have been ‘wary’ of Belar-
us’s initiative. See Беларусь разработала концепцию 
запуска «Хельсинки-2» и работает над ее реализацией 
– Макей,	5	January	2018,	http://www.belta.by/politics/
view/belarus-razrabotala-kontseptsiju-zapuska-helsin-
ki-2-i-rabotaet-nad-ee-realizatsiej-makej-283334-2018/ 
15 The conference Eastern Europe, seeking security for all 
was organised by the Belarusian Minsk Dialogue think 
tank, which has been active since 2015. 
16 In his speech Lukashenko repeatedly stressed the right 
and obligation of small countries to act to bring about 
peace	in	order	not	to	become	victims	of	conflict	between	
the	 large	 international	 players.	 See	 А.	 Александров, 
Т.	Коровенкова,	Минский диалог. Лукашенко говорил 
о мутации вызовов и страшной болезни политиков, 
https://naviny.by/article/20180524/1527158370-min-
skiy-dialog-lukashenko-govoril-o-mutacii-vyzovov-i
-strashnoy-bolezni 
Based on experience in organising talks 
on the subject of Ukraine, the Belarusian 
President named Minsk as the venue for 
the peace process.
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position in the matter17 should a US base be 
created in Poland.
Can Belarus afford to stay neutral?
Numerous statements made by Belarusian of-
ficials	 indicate	 that	 the	main	 external	 threat	 is	
the escalation of tensions between Russia and 
the West. The country’s strategic location be-
tween Russia and the West, initially considered 
an advantage, has now become a potential 
threat to Belarus’s security, and perhaps even 
its independence. Russia has become aggressive 
and demanding of its Belarusian ally, while the 
West continues to be remote in terms of values 
and legal and administrative system standards 
which	are	ill-suited	to	the	specific	nature	of	an	
authoritarian regime. This has led the Belaru-
sian authorities to conclude that the only effec-
tive guarantee of their survival will be measures 
aimed at universal recognition as a country not 
committed	to	either	side	in	the	conflict,	taking	
17 For more on this subject see Макей о военной базе РФ 
в Беларуси: «Нет ничего невозможного»,	1	June	2018,	
https://naviny.by/new/20180601/1527850414-makey-o-
voennoy-baze-rf-v-belarusi-net-nichego-nevozmozhnogo 
an active role as a mediator (or host of the talks, 
as the case may be) in peace processes. 
Thus	 Minsk	 is	 trying	 to	 redefine	 its	 foreign	
policy based on the tradition, dating back to 
the 1990s, of striving to be neutral. Although 
it might possibly strengthen Belarus’ interna-
tional standing, there are serious limitations to 
the concept as thus formulated, because it is 
difficult	 to	 recognise	 as	 a	 neutral	 (or	 at	 least	
credible) mediator a country which is an active 
member of a military bloc (the Collective Se-
curity Treaty Organisation) led by Russia, and 
which above all is in a close military alliance 
with Moscow. Achieving Minsk’s ambitions in 
the role of mediator will therefore depend less 
on the effectiveness of Belarusian diplomacy 
and more on the favour of the Kremlin, which 
expects complete loyalty and subordination 
from Belarus. This means that in the long run 
the Belarusian authorities will only be able to 
imitate attempts at neutrality, out of regard for 
Russia’s interests in the region.
